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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES:
HOW MANY CELL PHONE
LOCATION POINTS CONSTITUTE A
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT?
DOUGLAS HARRIS*
INTRODUCTION
Did you know that cell-phone service providers collect and store
your location data every time you place or receive a phone call? Your
answer to this question may impact how the Supreme Court views the
warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records, including the
location and movement of the user, under current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
Using a cell phone would not be possible without the existence of
cell towers or “cell sites.”1 Cell phones have to connect to nearby cell
towers with the best signal to access the cellular network and make a
call.2 Cellular service providers record which cell sites are used when a
customer starts and ends a phone call, thereby creating cell site
location information (“CSLI”).3 “The precision of a cell phone user’s
location reflected in CSLI records depends on the size of the cell site
‘sectors’ in the area”; when there are more antennas on the cell site,
there are more sectors.4 Areas with the most cell sites and the smallest
sectors, like urban metropolitan areas, make the CSLI data pertaining
to a user’s potential location within the sector more accurate.5
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In Carpenter v. United States,6 the Supreme Court must decide
whether the government’s acquisition of a suspect’s CSLI records
during an ongoing criminal investigation is a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment, and thus requires a showing of probable cause to
obtain a warrant. Petitioner, Timothy Carpenter, used his cell phone
before and after robbing multiple stores in the Detroit area.7 Cell sites
covered areas in Detroit ranging from half a mile to two miles.8 When
assessing whether the government was legally entitled to gather his
CSLI records, the Court must account for a 1986 statute, the Stored
Communications Act.9 The statute carves out an exception for
accessing such records—the governmental entity must only show
“reasonable grounds” during an ongoing criminal investigation to
obtain a court order.10 The Court must rely on various tests
concerning business records, property-based analyses, and reasonable
expectations of privacy to come to a decision. Thus, the Court’s
opinion may hinge on a reasonable person’s answer to the question
opening this Commentary.
Although this opinion will have future consequences for
Americans and their privacy interests as cell sites continue to be built
and CSLI records increasingly contain more private information,11
this Commentary argues that the necessity of owning and using cell
phones renders past tests obsolete. With wavering, subjective
expectations of what information is actually private in society today,
the Court should thus create a new test that makes a prescriptive
claim about expectations of privacy and compares newer technologies
with older ones. The Court should then hold that obtaining CSLI
records without a warrant is an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
I. FACTS
Petitioner, Timothy Carpenter, was convicted of committing a
series of armed robberies at several Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores
throughout Michigan and Ohio from December 2010 to March 2011.12

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 15.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 13.
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In April 2011, police arrested four individuals involved in the crimes.13
One of the individuals confessed that he was a part of a group of
fifteen men—“a shifting ensemble of . . . getaway drivers and
lookouts”—that robbed nine stores.14 The confessor gave the FBI all
participants’ cellphone numbers.15
In May and June 2011, the FBI submitted three orders to
magistrate judges for “transactional records” from wireless cellphone
carriers for sixteen different phone numbers.16 In addition to a list of
numbers called and received, the FBI requested “cell site information
for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for
incoming and outcoming calls” beginning on December 1, 2010.17 The
FBI stated that these records would provide evidence that Petitioner
and others violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.18 The magistrates
granted the requests pursuant to the Stored Communications Act,19
which allows courts to issue orders when “the governmental entity
offers specific and articulable facts showing that the contents of a wire
or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”20 MetroPCS turned over 127 days of cell-site records21
including 186 pages of Carpenter’s cell phone records showing the cell
site and sector at the start and end of his phone calls.22
Although MetroPCS was Petitioner’s primary provider, the
company did not have coverage in one of the areas the charged
robberies took place.23 When Petitioner was in that area, his phone
began to use Sprint’s cell towers since MetroPCS had a roaming
agreement with Sprint that increased MetroPCS customers’ coverage

13. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (2017).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery
or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”) .
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
20. Id. § 2703(d); Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.
21. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 14.
22. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 19.
23. Id. at 20.
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area.24 Sprint thus provided two days of cell site location
information.25 In total, the government accessed 12,898 CSLI data
points, an average of 101 points per day.26
Petitioner was charged with counts of aiding and abetting robbery
that affected interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, and
aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a federal
crime of violence.27 Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the
CSLI records “on the basis that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
their acquisition without probable cause and a warrant.”28 The
Eastern Michigan District Court denied Petitioner’s motion to
suppress the government’s cell-site evidence because “people do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI records—and,
consequently, their acquisition by the government does not constitute
a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment.”29
At trial, seven accomplices testified that Petitioner organized most
of the robberies, supplied the guns, and served as a lookout.30 As an
expert witness, an FBI agent testified about the cell-site data and how
cell sites in Detroit individually cover areas ranging from a half-mile
to two miles.31 The agent created maps showcasing how Petitioner’s
phone was “within a half-mile to two miles of the location of each of
the robberies around the time the robberies happened,” placing him
near the scene of each crime.32
Petitioner was convicted by a jury on all of the Hobbs Act counts
and all but one of the gun counts.33 He was sentenced to 116 years and
4 months imprisonment.34 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision, relying on United States v. Jones,35 where five Justices
agreed that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
“longer term GPS monitoring in government investigations of most

24. See id.
25. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 15.
26. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 21.
27. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016).
28. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 21.
29. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 21.
30. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.
31. Id. at 885.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. (“Carpenter’s convictions on the § 924(c) counts subjected him to four
mandatory-minimum prison sentences of 25 years, each to be served consecutively, leaving him
with a Sentencing Guidelines range of 1,395 to 1,428 months’ imprisonment.”).
35. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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offenses.”36 The Sixth Circuit distinguished CSLI data from GPS
monitoring, held that individuals do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with CSLI data,37 and further held that this
type of collection of business records is not a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment.38 Carpenter’s petition for a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court of the United States was granted on June 5,
2017.39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment affords individuals a constitutional right
to privacy: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . .”40 Although the Fourth Amendment was
originally interpreted to protect citizens from government intrusion
into homes,41 it now “protects people, not places.”42 This wider
conception of the Fourth Amendment not limited to physical
intrusions came with a “twofold requirement” test: (1) the person
must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) “the
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”43 Although Justice Harlan formed this test in his
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,44 the Court has applied his
analysis to later cases.45
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that FBI agents must show
probable cause to obtain a warrant for attaching an electronic
recording device to a public telephone booth.46 In Justice Harlan’s
analysis, the crucial fact was that a person speaking inside a closed
phone booth reasonably assumes that his call is not being
36. Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 22−23 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
37. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888.
38. Id. at 890.
39. Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (“Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th
century.”).
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 360.
45. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405−06 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
46. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355−59.
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intercepted.47 Twelve years later in Smith v. Maryland,48 the Court
considered whether a warrant was required for the police to request a
telephone company to install a pen register at an individual’s office.49
The pen register would record which numbers were dialed from the
individual’s home.50 The Court applied the Katz analysis, stating that
telephone users do not have “any actual expectation of privacy in the
numbers they dial” because people must “convey phone numbers to
the telephone company” to complete the calls.51 The Court continued
by stating that “[a]ll subscribers realize . . . that the phone company . . .
make[s] permanent records of the numbers they dial.”52 For the
second part of the test, the Court held that a person has “no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.”53 Nonetheless, the Court maintained that the
content of the phone call—the words spoken during the
conversation—was private.54
Forty-five years after Katz, in United States v. Jones,55 the Court
held that the government’s attachment of a GPS device on a citizen’s
vehicle to monitor its movements was a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.56 However, Justice Scalia, in writing for the majority, did
not apply the Katz test because “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”57 Instead, the majority
relied on a textual analysis of the Fourth Amendment with an
individual’s vehicle being an “effect,” a term listed along with persons,
houses, and papers.58 The majority’s recapitulation of Harlan’s

47. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
49. Id. at 737.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 742 (quotations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 743−44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442−44 (1976); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335−36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)
(plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963)).
54. See id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to keep the
contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to
preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”).
55. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
56. Id. at 404.
57. Id. at 406.
58. See id. at 404 (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in
the Amendment.”).

HARRIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

3/8/2018 2:10 PM

HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?

107

standard from Katz was that it should be used in “add[ition] to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”59
In United States v. Miller,60 the Court reiterated that it
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.61

This voluntary disclosure of information to third parties diminishes
the individual’s expectation of privacy, even in the context of a
governmental entity obtaining a person’s bank records.62 The bank
records were not “private papers” but were the bank’s business
records.63 Accordingly, “the depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government.”64
In addition to addressing the precedential impact of these cases,
Carpenter will likely address the Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2703, which states in relevant part that “[a] governmental
entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or
remote computing service to disclose a record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not
including the contents of communications) only when the
governmental entity” obtains a warrant or a court order.65 Although a
warrant requires probable cause,66 the statute allows a court order for
disclosure “when the governmental entity offers specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”67 Thus, the statute allows a
“reasonable grounds” standard for accessing certain records from a
telephone company. The Stored Communications Act became
59. Id. at 409; see also id. at 414 (“[T]he trespassory test applied in the majority’s opinion
reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the government physically invades
personal property to gather information, a search occurs.”).
60. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
61. Id. at 443.
62. Id. at 442.
63. Id. at 440.
64. Id. at 443.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012).
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).

HARRIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

108

3/8/2018 2:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13

effective in 1986, a time where communications records were never as
comprehensive as they are today.
III. HOLDING
In Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision,
holding that the government’s collection of CSLI as a request for
business records was not a Fourth Amendment search.68 The court
began its analysis with a brief history of the Fourth Amendment,
discussing its historical expansion from a “property-based
understanding” to “protect[ing] certain expectations of privacy as
well,”69 and the creation of the Katz test to determine what is a
“search.”70 Then, the court focused on the content-context distinction
that further guides the analysis.71 In Katz, the police could not surveil
the content of the conversation taking place in the phone booth
without a warrant, nor could the police listen to the conversations in
Smith.72 However, the caller in Smith could not expect the context of
his conversation—the phone numbers he dialed—to remain private.73
Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the content of emails
are still protected, courts have not extended the same protection to
metadata used in sending these internet communications, “like sender
and recipient addresses on an email, or IP addresses.”74
Based on this precedent, the court found that “the business
records here fall on the unprotected side of this line” because CSLI
data helped facilitate the personal communications and did not
include the actual content of the communications.75 Using Smith, the
court reasoned that cellphone users knew, during a call, they were

68. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016).
69. Id. at 886.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 883 (“In Fourth Amendment cases the Supreme Court has long recognized a
distinction between the content of a communication and the information necessary to convey
it.”).
72. Id. at 887.
73. See id. (“But in Smith, the Court held that the police’s installation of a pen register—a
device that tracked the phone numbers a person dialed from his home phone—was not a search
because the caller could not reasonably expect those numbers to remain private. ‘Although [the
caller’s] conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his
conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he
dialed.’”) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).
74. See id. (citing United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510
(9th Cir. 2007)).
75. Id.
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exposing their location to the nearest cell tower and its respective
company because these users saw their “phone[s’] signal strength
fluctuate.”76 Additionally, anyone that paid cellphone charges should
have expected that these phone companies recorded locational
information for “legitimate business purposes.”77 When the Sixth
Circuit applied the test from Katz, the court emphasized language
from Smith: “it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature
of the state activity that is challenged.”78 Because the nature of the
activity is obtaining business records from a third party, these
defendants had a diminished expectation of privacy for the related
information.79
The Sixth Circuit paid great deference to the legislative intent of
the Stored Communication Act, explaining that “[t]he act strikes out a
middle ground between full Fourth Amendment protection and no
protection at all” with its “reasonable grounds” requirement.80 This
middle ground was constitutional because the second part of the Katz
test asks if the expectation of privacy “is one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable”81 and society, in the form of elected
legislators, has “struck a balance that it thinks is reasonable.”82 The
majority opinion finally acknowledged the exponential speed at which
technology advances,83 thus making Congress the better body of
government to deal with these types of issues.
The Sixth Circuit supplemented their analysis by comparing the
case to Jones, repeating that the attachment of a GPS device did not
concern business records and, thus, deals with a different legal
question.84 But the court still distinguished the facts at hand from
Jones, since CSLI is not as accurate as GPS information.85 GPS data
was accurate within fifty feet but the locational data here was
76. See id. at 888.
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 741) (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 888−89.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 889−90 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
82. Id. at 890.
83. See id. (“But sometimes new technologies—say, the latest iterations of smartphones or
social media—evolve at rates more common to superbugs than to large mammals. In those
situations judges are less good at evaluating the empirical assumptions that underlie their
constitutional judgments.”).
84. See id. at 889 (“That sort of government intrusion presents one set of Fourth
Amendment questions; government collection of business records presents another. And the
question presented here, as shown above, is answered by Smith.”).
85. Id.
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“accurate within a 3.5 million square-foot to 100 million square-foot
area.”86 The court was also careful to say that Petitioner “lack[ed] any
property interest in cell-site records created and maintained by their
wireless carriers.”87
Conversely, Judge Stranch’s concurrence asserted that
approaching the case by focusing on how the information is
voluntarily disclosed to third parties “is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”88 Judge
Stranch conceded that CSLI data was less precise than GPS tracking
but used United States v. Skinner89 to assert her concern that “longterm location monitoring in government investigations impinges on
expectations of privacy.”90 The court in Skinner held that the
“defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
GPS data and the location of his cellphone” when DEA agents
tracked him over three days.91 Judge Stranch was worried that this
case reached the territory Justice Alito warned about in Jones: “there
may be situations where police, using otherwise legal methods, so
comprehensively track a person’s activities that the very
comprehensiveness of the tracking is unreasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes.” The tracking here exceeded Skinner by
collecting four months of CSLI data.92 Judge Stranch argued that the
existing tests make the business records containing CSLI data akin to
business records containing credit card purchases, which do not reflect
personal location to the same degree.93 Thus, Judge Stranch believed
this type of treatment showed the need for a new test.94

86. Id.
87. Id. at 888.
88. Id. at 894 (Stranch, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
89. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
90. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 895.
91. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780−81 (6th Cir. 2012).
92. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 895.
93. See id. at 889 (“In light of the personal tracking concerns articulated in our precedent,
I am not convinced that the situation before us can be addressed appropriately with a test
primarily used to obtain business records such as credit card purchases—records that do not
necessarily reflect personal location.”).
94. Id. at 896.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
In Carpenter, Petitioner and the United States disagree about
whether the collection of CSLI data pursuant to the Stored Collection
Act is constitutional. Namely, the issue is whether a governmental
entity can obtain a court order for such information without showing
probable cause.
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner’s arguments are grounded in the privacy concern that
allowing this warrantless access of CSLI data will result in the
government’s ability to use this tool to access any citizen’s minute-byminute location.95 Petitioner’s conclusion is supported by (1) using the
Katz test in union with the similar facts in Jones to state that
Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy with the CSLI
records, (2) supplementing the property-based analysis in using
another relevant congressional statute, and (3) downplaying the thrust
of the third-party/business records doctrine.
First, Petitioner argued that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with their longer-term cellular location records
under the Katz test. Petitioner used language from Jones in his
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy calculus, accounting for the
expectation of privacy against the government prior to the creation of
the new technology.96 As people expect the government to not
secretly monitor the movement of their vehicles, they also expect the
same privacy with their longer-term cell phone location records
because cell phones are carried almost everywhere people go.97
Therefore, before the advent of cell-phones, the government could not
intimately track individuals in this manner.98 Petitioner bolstered his
claim of confidentiality with the federal Telecommunications Act, 47
U.S.C. § 222(c)(1), which declared that cell phone providers cannot
disclose location data without “approval of the customer.”99
Petitioner’s worry is exacerbated with future technological
advancements likely narrowing the location accuracy gap between
95. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 30.
96. See id. at 30−31 (“[T]his Court has stressed that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
inquiry must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed’
prior to the advent of the new technology in question.”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 406 (2012)).
97. Id. at 32−34.
98. Id. at 35−36.
99. Id. at 40−41.
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GPS and CSLI, especially with more cell sites being constructed in
dense areas.100 Furthermore, CSLI records are expanding and
becoming more plentiful in conjunction with cellular service providers
collecting and retaining location information when an individual
checks a text message, sends an email, and uses apps.101
Second, Petitioner used a property-based analysis to argue that
CSLI records constitute protected “papers” under the Fourth
Amendment because CSLI data is rendered as “customary
proprietary
network
information”
under
the
federal
Telecommunications Act;102 this information cannot be disclosed
“without the express prior authorization of the customer.”103
Accordingly, the statute made CSLI a proprietary interest of the
customer as a “paper” or “effect” and therefore, the data is owned by
the customer and not the carrier.104
Last, Petitioner argued that the premise of the third-party
doctrine, the idea that disclosing information to a third party
necessarily ensures that the individual cannot reasonably expect the
information to be private, is merely a factor to be considered and not
a dispositive test.105 The petitioner claimed that this principle,
combined with the recognition that the Fourth Amendment must
account for new technology, effectively resolves this case.106 Therefore,
by showing a reasonable expectation of privacy and that this
disclosure is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the
Government must show probable cause to obtain a warrant for CSLI
records.107
B. The Government’s Arguments
In response to Petitioner’s argument about third-party disclosure
and reasonable expectation of privacy, the Government first argued
that Petitioner cannot claim a privacy interest in CSLI records that he
100. Id. at 44−45.
101. Id. at 51.
102. Id. at 57.
103. 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (2012).
104. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 59.
105. See id. at 74 (“Although it may someday be necessary to ‘reconsider the premise’ of
the third-party doctrine, it is not necessary in this case to reassess its continued validity in every
possible context. Properly understood, the disclosure of information to a third party is but one
factor in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.”) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
106. Id. at 74−75.
107. Id. at 92.
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voluntarily disclosed to his cell-service providers.108 The Government
relied upon Smith’s strong language that “[t]his Court consistently has
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntary turns over to third parties.”109 Petitioner,
too, cannot have any subjective expectation of privacy of this
information because Miller established that one “can assert neither
ownership nor possession” of cell-site records110 and cell phone users
generally understand that their phones must communicate with cell
towers to make and receive calls.111 Additionally, cell-phone users
cannot have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy with
voluntarily disclosed information to third parties.112
In relation to Jones, the Government argued that, unlike attaching
a GPS device to a vehicle, the Government did not intrude on
Petitioner’s privacy interests by recording the cell towers used to
make his phone calls.113 The phone companies created these records
for their own business purposes.114
In response to Petitioner’s claim that the third-party doctrine is
not necessarily dispositive when it involves highly sensitive
information, the Government worried about “intractable line-drawing
problems.”115 Pragmatically, the Government finds it problematic that
Petitioner did not provide a framework for defining what is
sufficiently sensitive information.116 Nevertheless, investigators could
not even apply this hypothetical standard about sensitivity until they
take the first step: accessing the records.117
The Government argued that this collection of CSLI records
failed the property-based analysis since Petitioner “did not create
those records and has no right to control their content.”118 Nor could a
property interest be grounded in 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) since the
statute also permits disclosure “as required by law”—which it is under
the Stored Communications Act.119
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 28.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743−44 (1979)).
Id. at 33−34 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976)).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 37−38.
Id. at 54−59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49−50.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69−70.

HARRIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

114

3/8/2018 2:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13

The Government also rejected Petitioner’s reliance on 47 U.S.C. §
222(c)(1) for calculating an asserted expectation of privacy when the
Court previously rejected the suggestion that “the Amendment was
intended to incorporate subsequently enacted statutes.”120
Moreover, the Government rejected Petitioner’s claim about these
records “leav[ing] all such data beyond constitutional control, making
it possible for the government to collect all Americans’ cell-site data
for all time” because the Fourth Amendment still protects business
records
in
terms
of
“arbitrariness,
overbreadth,
and
burdensomeness.”121 Here, the collection of records before and after
the unsolved crime was not arbitrary.122 Since there can be other
reasons for Petitioner to be in that area, the several weeks of data can
help distinguish which location points are actually relevant.123
In response to Petitioner’s claims that CSLI will become more
precise over time with future technology, the Government suggested
that this claim is without merit by providing a hypothetical instance
where this would not occur: “[f]or example, device-to-device
technology could reduce the need for cell towers, preventing
providers from collecting or recording location information.”124
Lastly, the Government argued that even if the collection of
business records was a search under the Fourth Amendment, it
remained constitutionally reasonable125 because cases have
established that governmental entities can acquire documents via
subpoena when Congress authorizes the investigation.126 The
Government also recognized how certain investigations require
subpoenas of this nature because “the very purpose of requesting the
information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists.”127 The
Government believed the Sixth Circuit correctly held that this
warrantless procurement of Petitioner’s CSLI records complied with
the Fourth Amendment.128

120. Id. at 40 (quoting Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 n.3 (2008)).
121. Id. at 63.
122. Id. at 64−65.
123. Id. at 65.
124. Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 70.
126. Id. at 72−73 (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)); see
Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
127. Id. at 75 (quoting United States v. R. Enters, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991)).
128. Id. at 90.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should reverse the judgment of the Sixth
Circuit and hold that accessing CSLI data for an extended period is a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the government must
show probable cause to obtain a warrant for accessing Petitioner’s
longer-term CSLI records.
With the need to have a cell phone to be a productive member of
society129 and the impracticability of living “off the grid,” American
citizens necessarily have to disclose information to third parties like
cellular providers. It does not follow that individuals have to sacrifice
any privacy rights or Fourth Amendment protections by owning a cell
phone—a device that can enable citizens to be tracked by
governmental agencies in unprecedented ways. Chief Justice Roberts
has even gone so far as to say that cell phones “are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human
anatomy.”130 Therefore, the Court should hold that voluntarily
disclosing information to a third party in this manner does not imply
that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
pertaining to that information. The Court should not refer to CSLI
data under the façade of being “business records” to downplay an
individual’s right to privacy like the Court has done in the past with
credit card records.131
The true hardship lies in Carpenter’s line-drawing inquiry—at
what point does accessing CSLI records become a search under the
Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring a governmental entity to show
probable cause to obtain a search warrant? Although access to a few
location points is not a per se search,132 accessing thousands of

129. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 75 (“In our time, unless a person is willing to
live ‘off the grid,’ it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most personal of information to
third-party service providers on a constant basis, just to navigate daily life.”) (quoting United
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 525 (11th Cir. 2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring)).
130. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
131. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 895 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concurring)
(“In light of the personal tracking concerns articulated in our precedent, I am not convinced
that the situation before us can be addressed appropriately with a test primarily used to obtain
business records such as credit card purchases—records that do not necessarily reflect personal
location.”).
132. Petitioner concedes that there is some period of time where the Government can
access a person’s CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
1, at 53.
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location points undoubtedly becomes a search. The existing tests are
not suitable to handle this legal question.
Treating CSLI data as business records undermines the
comprehensive location data involved and does not help draw
territorial lines of what constitutes a search.133 The reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test created in Katz is similarly limited when
treating CSLI as mere business records. Even if the Katz inquiry
treated cell phones and their CSLI as pieces of property, it is difficult
for society to reasonably regard CSLI records as private information
when the government and other third parties continuously gain access
to what was once perceived as private information. Society does not
have to look any further than the WikiLeaks documents about the
NSA’s capabilities134 and by viewing personalized advertisements
when scrolling Facebook that are based on past internet search
results135 to understand that third parties can create comprehensive
pictures of us based on our daily habits. Allowing the Government to
procure CSLI records without a warrant would essentially allow the
government to watch us walk through this world. So, although
Americans should have an expectation of privacy with collected
information embedded in newer technologies, we do not.
The Sixth Circuit’s content/context distinction, too, blurs the line
separating searches from non-searches. The test should have to
delineate the type of data (CSLI pertaining to incoming/outcoming
calls, text messages, emails, apps, etc.) and amount of data that
constitutes a search—thus incorporating future changes in technology
when CSLI becomes more precise.
Although the Court should undoubtedly recognize that Carpenter
bears enough resemblance to Jones to constitute a search, courts will
run into similar issues with future cases where a new technology
opens the door for the government to collect data on individuals.
Thus, Carpenter, as Judge Stranch suggests, calls for the Court to
create a new test altogether to handle the situations where “police,
using otherwise legal methods, so comprehensively track a person’s
133. Id.
134. See Craig Timberg, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Ellen Nakashima, WikiLeaks: The CIA is
Using Popular TVs, Smartphones and Cars to Spy on their Owners, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/07/why-the-cia-is-using-your-tvssmartphones-and-cars-for-spying/?utm_term=.f590dcbadbb7.
135. See Noam Scheiber, Facebook’s Ad-Targeting Problem, Captured in a Literal Shade of
Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/technology/facebookads.html.
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activities that the very comprehensiveness of the tracking is
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.”136 Although
precedent is limited by its current landscape, technology continues to
grow at an unprecedented rate—changing how society lives and views
privacy as a whole. “[O]ur precedent suggests the need to develop a
new test to determine when a warrant may be necessary under these
or comparable circumstances.”137
Accessing business records should be treated the same way as if a
person’s location was being physically tracked by a governmental
officer. Obtaining few CSLI location points would not be a search
under the Fourth Amendment, much like a police officer tailing a
suspect’s vehicle for a few minutes would not be a search.138 Katz’s
subjective element of the test should not be a part of this new test
because Americans have widely inconsistent views about what
information cell phone providers actually carry and the degree to
which we expect the records to be private. The new test should
account for how recent technologies are increasingly being
incorporated into Americans’ daily lives along with how the same
technology enables the government to intrude into people’s every day
affairs without physically following an individual or searching items
that are tangibly carried by that person.
A new privacy test that can handle technological advances
involving third parties like cellphone service companies and records
of information could be as follows:
A person has an expectation of privacy to information data
(including information that the person jointly owns) when (1) the
expectation is one that society should be prepared to recognize as
reasonable and (2) the expectation is similar to the reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding similar information data existing
before the technology at issue was created.

This test uses the broad term “information data” to account for all
types of records and uses the term “jointly owns” because of Chief
Justice Roberts’ views that cellphone records are a joint venture by
the cellphone company and phone owner.139 The first element of the
136. Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 896 (quoting United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th
Cir. 2012)).
137. Id.
138. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”).
139. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Drawing a Line on Privacy for Cellphone

HARRIS FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

118

3/8/2018 2:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13

test is derived from the Katz test but uses the word “should.” This is
important since it would require a court to make a prescriptive claim
about what information ought to be considered private. The second
element would force courts to think about comparable information
and their respective expectations of privacy before the technology at
issue was developed. The Court would compare Petitioner’s CSLI
data with being tracked by a GPS, albeit a less accurate one, over 127
days. With the freedom to rule about how much the government can
intrude into an individual’s daily affairs with and without a warrant,
the Court can determine the line about how many CSLI location
points constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, but a
bright-line rule is not necessary. The Court can set precedent that
CSLI records over 127 days constitutes a search while admitting that
they are not deciding the minimum for how many days and location
points is always a search. The Court’s language should be carefully
reasoned since it would guide how the lower courts approach
technology and their respective privacy concerns for years to come.
CONCLUSION
Obtaining CSLI records for an extended period of time violates
serious privacy concerns when an individual can be comprehensively
tracked by their location data. In Carpenter, the Court should find that
the Fourth Amendment protects this type of information that is
disclosed to cellular companies and that requesting these documents
is a search under the Fourth Amendment. A governmental entity
should have to obtain a search warrant after showing probable cause
in order to access these records. A new test that requires the Court to
make prescriptive claims about expectations of privacy while
comparing newer technologies with older technologies would account
for these privacy concerns.

Records, but Where?, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 29, 2017, 2:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2017/11/ argument-analysis-drawing-line-privacy-cellphone-records/.

